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INTRODUCTION
In 1984, the English scientist Alec Jeffery discovered the variable DNA
markers that exist within every person. 1 Within a year, the English police
became the first law enforcement agency to use DNA’s identification
capabilities to successfully catch a criminal. 2 The technique crossed the pond
to the United States and was soon followed by the creation of a national DNA
profile database in 1990. 3 At first, the database was just for sex offenders.
Then it was for all felons, then convicted criminals, and now even arrestees. 4
Additionally, some local DNA databases, which lack the regulations and
restrictions that federal law imposes on the national database, include
witnesses, victims, family members of victims, and helpful citizens who
responded to DNA dragnets. 5 This power creep has continued as law
enforcement agencies expand the DNA identification technique’s reach ever
further with the implementation of familial searches, which capture individuals
with genetic relation to a DNA profile in the database. 6
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While commentators have begun confronting the constitutional and
public policy implications of DNA profile databases 7 and familial searches, 8
new titans of DNA storage have emerged: commercial DNA databases.
Companies such as 23andMe and Ancestry have vast DNA banks collected
from individuals voluntarily for non-law enforcement purposes. By April
2020, 23andMe and Ancestry had roughly 10 and 16 million customers,
respectively. 9 Smaller companies such as MyHeritage, Family Tree DNA,
National Geographic, and many others only add to this monumental
resource. 10 The incredible number of DNA profiles in these databases
combined with the new familial search technique could subject vast amounts
of the American populace to genetic surveillance. Indeed, these companies
have already been subpoenaed on multiple occasions by law enforcement and
in some cases have already volunteered to work with them. 11
In what follows, this comment will explore the constitutional and privacy
issues surrounding commercial DNA databases, ultimately concluding that
despite the Supreme Court’s narrowing of the third-party doctrine, it should
not be unconstitutional for law enforcement to use the genetic profiles in
commercial databases without a warrant, though the companies might have a
colorable argument for requiring a pre-compliance review before producing
any records. Part I of this comment will describe the science behind DNA
testing and familial searches and the structure of the federal DNA database.
Part II will examine the constitutionality of DNA databases and searches as
well as the constitutionality of familial searches, ultimately concluding that both
pass constitutional muster. Part III will discuss the factual and legal framework
needed to analyze commercial DNA databases. Part IV will analyze the
constitutionality and practicality of police use of commercial DNA databases.
Finally, this comment will conclude with the potential implications of
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unbridled genetic surveillance and a call to Congress to enact uniform
regulations across federal, state, and local databases. 12
I. WHAT IS DNA AND HOW DOES LAW ENFORCEMENT USE IT?
To properly understand the developments in DNA identification and the
distinction between individual and familial searches it is necessary to have an
understanding of the scientific and institutional framework that exists in the
United States.

A. The Science of DNA Identification
Deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, is the building block of human genetic
code and can be found in every human cell. 13 DNA is made up of four
chemical bases: adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine, which are assembled
into the iconic double helix structure. 14 Each cell contains twenty-three pairs
of chromosomes, which are long chains of DNA bases (nucleotides), half of
which are passed down from each parent to their child. 15 For our purposes,
there are two types of relevant DNA; mitochondrial and nuclear. 16
Mitochondrial DNA is a specific type of DNA that contains one small
circular chromosome and is found in the mitochondria, the powerhouse of
the cell. 17 Mitochondrial DNA makes up less than 1% of one’s total DNA,
but is unique in that it is passed down solely from the mother. 18 While
mitochondrial searches are not as specific or accurate as the more common
nuclear DNA search method, the technique allows for a broader reach as each
maternal relative will have the exact same sequence. 19 This means that while
it generally does not have the reliability required for criminal trials, it can be
helpful for police investigations. 20 Mitochondrial DNA is also much more
suitable for crime scene investigations where the DNA has partially degraded
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Tanaka, supra note 14, at 120.
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because mass amounts of copies of mitochondrial DNA exist in each cell. In
contrast, with nuclear DNA, a scientist would need to find another intact cell
in order to string together a missing sequence. 21 However, mitochondrial
DNA searches are mostly still a developing science for which the full potential
remains to be realized. 22
Nuclear DNA makes up the majority of one’s DNA and is what is
primarily used by law enforcement. Within nuclear DNA, about 2-3%
contains genes or coding DNA. 23 This is how one might get their mother’s
eyes or their father’s Huntington’s disease. The other 98% of the DNA was
long thought to serve no functional purpose and was thus popularly termed
“junk” DNA, although more recent studies have shown that much of it has
roles in regulating how the coding regions are used. 24 This “junk” DNA is
what is primarily used for identification. 25 In total, each person has about three
billion chemical base pairs that, in a string, form sequences to create genes. 26
The order of the chemical bases (A, C, G, T) in nuclear DNA is mostly the
same from individual to individual, but some locations contain difference
sequences. 27 The sequence difference at a specific location is referred to as an
allele. 28 The variations and patterns in the sequences, or polymorphisms,
create the ability to uniquely identify individuals. 29 The most popular type of
polymorphism for DNA identification purposes is the short-tandem repeat,
or STR, named for the several short patterns of repeated chemical base pairs
in a row. STRs vary widely in length and copy number among people; thus,
if enough STRs are looked at, each person will have a unique set of specific
STRs.
The FBI standard, used in the federal database, CODIS, compares
sequences at thirteen locations (loci), using a total of twenty-six alleles for the
search. 30 A comparison of two DNA samples’ alleles’ STR patterns at those
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Id. at 121.
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Id. at 6.
Id. at 6.
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Id. at 115.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 119.
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loci can determine whether the DNA comes from the same source. 31 Exact,
complete matches between the crime scene DNA and the suspect’s DNA
mean that it is overwhelmingly likely that the suspect’s DNA was present at
the crime scene. 32 Similarly, anything but an exact match clears that suspect’s
DNA from the crime scene sample. 33 However, a close match, deemed a
partial match, indicates that the suspect might share a genetic kinship with the
crime scene DNA. The closer the match, the higher the probability that the
two samples are related. 34
There are three types of relevant matches: First, full matches, where the
database profile contains every allele from the crime scene DNA, thus making
the profile a suspect. 35 Second, partial matches, where the database profile
contains alleles not found in the crime scene DNA, due to a variety of reasons
such as a muddled sample, making the profile and its genetic relatives suspects.
Third, familial matches, where the DNA profile differs from the crime scene
sample in a way that clears the database inhabitant from suspicion, but makes
it very probable that the inhabitant has a relative outside the database who was
the source. 36 For now, due to the number of alleles tested, the familial match
DNA analysis is only effective for close relations; parent-child, or full sibling
relationships. 37
With respect to the potential power of familial searches, a 1996 study
reported that half of all inmates surveyed said they had close family members
who had been incarcerated. 38 This is probably an underestimate of the
technique’s potential reach considering there are inmates’ relatives who
committed crimes and were not convicted as well as people's tendency to
underreport bad behavior. 39 While it’s impossible to measure the technique’s
efficacy in the real world, as the databases grow, both due to more people
committing crimes and more actions being deemed worthy of DNA collection
(recall the power creep of sex crimes to felonies, to crimes, to arrestees), its
31
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Id. at 116. This is different from “the closer the match, the more closely the two DNA samples are
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Id. at 120.
Id. at 123.
Nicole J. Olynk Widmar et al., Social Desirability Bias in Reporting of Holiday Season
PREVENTATIVE
MED.
REPORTS,
Dec.
2016,
at
270–76,
Healthfulness,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4942737/ (finding that social desirability bias causes
people to underreport bad behavior, even in the benign context of holiday health habits).
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range will only broaden. 40 Similarly, as the science behind DNA analysis
improves and databases begin adding more alleles to the profiles, the
technique itself will become more refined and more powerful. 41

B. CODIS, the Federal DNA Database
CODIS, the Combined DNA Index System, is the federal database for
DNA profiles. It was created in 1990 by the FBI 42 with the purpose of tracking
sex offenders, but has since expanded drastically. 43 It is available to any
approved law enforcement agency and has resulted in a massive number of
hits and leads in cases. 44 As of March 2018, there are more than fourteen
million known individuals in the database, and it has survived all legal
challenges. 45 The CODIS database links all federal, state, and local
databases. 46 It has two sections, the Forensic Index, which contains crime
scene samples, and the Offender Index, which contains DNA from
individuals compelled to provide genetic samples. 47 When CODIS was
enacted, it was accompanied by a number of regulations regarding quality of
the DNA sample, privacy concerns, and protocols regarding the expungement
of profiles. 48
The federal database is restricted by a regulatory framework enacted to
protect privacy and shield it from legal challenges. 49 Such regulations include
regular audits, a prohibition on familial searches, limited comparison abilities
with partial matches, the removal of a DNA profile if the case is overturned
or the arrestee dismissed, and the removal of consensual DNA samples, which
are typically given by victims or suspects. 50 Additionally, the national labs can
take up to a month to confirm a match and twelve months to create a profile. 51
These regulations limit the efficacy of the federal database, leading some
40
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Kaye, supra note 3, at 123.
Id. at 124.
See Amanda Pattock, Note, It’s All Relative: Familial DNA Testing and the Fourth Amendment, 12
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 851, 856 (2011) (noting the creation of CODIS).
Suter, supra note 8, at 317.
Pattock, supra note 42, at 858.
Kreag, supra note 4, at 1494.
Suter, supra note 8, at 316.
Id. The DNA Identification Act of 1994 carves out “DNA samples that are voluntarily submitted
solely for elimination purposes” from being stored in the Index. 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2006).
However, “samples voluntarily contributed from relatives of missing persons” are permitted to be
stored. See Suter, supra note 8, at 315.
Pattock, supra note 42, at 857.
Kreag, supra note 4, at 1502.
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commentators to criticize it as ineffective, arguing that because it mostly
contains violent offenders’ DNA who are already in prison, it is redundant. 52

C. Local Databases
State and local databases are not limited by these restrictions. The
regulations on these databases are determined by the state legislature or in
some cases, the self-regulation of the law enforcement agency. 53 This is
problematic as law enforcement success is commonly measured by crime rates
and clearance rates, so there is little incentive for the police to limit their
investigative abilities. 54
The first local database was started in Palm Bay, Florida, after a private
DNA company approached the local police department in 2006. 55 Within six
months, the database contained 1400 profiles, burglary rates had decreased,
and clearance rates had increased. 56 The success of Palm Bay led to the spread
of local databases, and by 2013, the other police departments in Florida had
created their own databases and merged them with Palm Bay’s database,
creating a database of 13,000 profiles within a year. 57
Local databases are typically characterized by aggressive collection of
crime scene DNA. 58 This is typified by the index splits; the federal database
is made up of about 94% offender profiles and 6% crime scene samples. 59 In
contrast, the database for Bensalem, Pennsylvania has about a 50/50 split
between forensic and offender data. 60 What this indicates is a focus on DNA
searches for less serious crimes. 61 At the state level there are typically less
restrictions on the databases than the federal system. For instance, one of the
reasons Arizona developed its own state database was specifically for familial
searches, 62 and Alabama and Michigan have authorized the retention and
collection of DNA samples for medical research. 63 Notably in contrast,
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Vermont banned non-federal databases and Maryland and Washington D.C.
have banned familial searches. 64 However, most states in fact do not have
formal regulations and policies, leaving local law enforcement agencies to
decide their approach and defend it in court. 65
Moving forward, DNA identification techniques are only going to become
faster and more powerful. 66 Recent advances in testing have allowed scientists
to gain more information from less DNA, both in terms of damaged samples
and from new sources such as skin cells or saliva. 67 Tests are becoming faster
and cheaper, and federal funding is increasingly going to local databases. 68
Finally, just as the Palm Bay local DNA database was jumpstarted by a
corporate pitch, more companies are seeing law enforcement as a revenue
stream and expanding their DNA testing and databanks. 69
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHES

A. The Constitutionality of DNA Databases and Searches
From their inception, DNA banks have been challenged in court, typically
under the Fourth Amendment. 70 However they have survived all legal
challenges, even as they expanded in reach and power. 71 Courts typically
balance the intrusiveness and personal nature of DNA against a totality-of-thecircumstances, “reasonableness” of the search and the special needs of law
enforcement to identify suspects and lower recidivism. 72
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2001).
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See Heather Murphy, Coming Soon to a Police Station Near You: The DNA ‘Magic Box’, N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
21,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/science/dna-crime-genetechnology.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage (commenting on the
development of Magic Box, a new DNA technology).
Kreag, supra note 4, at 1504.
Id. at 1504–05.
Id. at 1506.
DNA evidence has never been held to be self-incrimination and worthy of Fifth Amendment
protections. See United States v. Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (finding that physical
evidence such as blood is not testimonial or communicative in nature and as such is not protected by
the right against self-incrimination). However, the extraction of bodily materials is a search and,
therefore, must be considered reasonable in order to be constitutional. Id. at 767–68.
Osagie K. Obasogie, The Dangers of Growing DNA Databases, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2010),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-apr-09-la-oe-obasogie9-2010apr09-story.html (noting
that 18 states had enacted legislation permitting the collection of DNA from arrestees); Kaye, supra
note 3, at 130.
Suter, supra note 8, at 329–30.
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The Fourth Amendment requires that “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause . . . .” 73 Courts have interpreted the role of this
amendment to protect privacy and regulate police action. All Fourth
Amendment analyses must begin with the threshold question of what
constitutes a search or seizure, because if the conduct in question is not a
search or seizure, then the protections of the Fourth Amendment do not
apply. 74 The examination typically proceeds either as a reasonable expectation
of privacy or a property analysis. In Katz, the Court laid out the first of these
paths, holding that what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not subject
to Fourth Amendment protection. 75 However, what that person seeks to
preserve as private may be constitutionally protected if the person had a
subjective belief of privacy in that area and society is willing the recognize that
belief as reasonable. 76 The other method of recognizing a search is through a
property analysis, typified by Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Jardines,
which held that police trespass onto the accused’s tangible property was an
unreasonable search and therefore a Fourth Amendment violation. 77
Once a court has determined that a warrantless search and seizure has
occurred, it must determine whether the search was either reasonable or in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Illustrative of this fault line with respect
to DNA searches is Maryland v. King. 78 In 2008, the Maryland legislature
authorized the expansion of its database by allowing the police to conduct a
cheek swab of any suspect charged with a violent crime. 79 There were some
protections if the suspect was ultimately not convicted, but the trigger for the
sample collection was an arrest. 80 The defendant, King, was swabbed and
matched to an unsolved break-in and rape, prompting the legal challenge. 81
King argued that the swab was inarguably a search and unconstitutional as it
was looking for evidence of a different crime without any reasonable

73
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U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
Id. at 351.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Florida. v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013).
Maryland. v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013).
Id. at 443.
Id. at 441.
Id.
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individualized suspicion, distinguishable from a search incident to arrest. 82
However, the Supreme Court upheld the Maryland statute using a
reasonableness analysis that balanced the defendant’s privacy concerns with
the government’s interest in law enforcement. 83 While Court agreed that the
swab was a search, it was minimally intrusive and arrested persons had a
lowered expectation of privacy.
Additionally, the Court held that the primary purpose of the DNA search
was identification, which was a special need beyond pure law enforcement, as
it had implications for bail and the suspect’s threat to the officers. 84
Justice Scalia wrote a scathing dissent, pointing out the various problems
with the majority’s special needs rationale, notably that identification took far
too long to be practical for the threat or bail arguments. 85 However, even
assuming that Scalia was right, and that the majority’s rationale is significantly
weakened, King demonstrates that the utility of DNA had such a powerful
effect on the Court that it was willing to be flexible with the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment.
This primary purpose argument is known as the “special needs” exception.
When the government has “special needs” beyond the typical law
enforcement context, and is investigating for purposes other than law
enforcement, situations can be balanced to uphold non-probable cause
searches, sometimes without individualized suspicion, even if what they do
results in criminal liability. One powerful special need that courts have found
for DNA databases beyond identification 86 and reducing recidivism 87 is closure
for victims. In United States v. Kincaid, the Ninth Circuit held that “by
contributing to the solution of past crimes, DNA profiling of qualified federal
offenders helps bring closure to countless victims of crime who long have
languished in the knowledge that perpetrators remain at large.” Upholding
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Brief for Respondent at 21, Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013) (No. 12-207) (2013) (“so too has
[the State] failed to establish any level of individualized suspicion that would have justified the search
of respondent”).
King, 569 U.S. at 448.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 471–72 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The truth, known to Maryland and increasingly to the reader:
this search had nothing to do with establishing King’s identity.”).
See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) (finding that a police checkpoint conducting suspicionless
searches in response to a hit-and-run was primarily information-seeking and not a violation of the
Fourth Amendment).
See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003) (“Ewing’s sentence is justified by the State’s publicsafety interest in . . . deterring recidivist felons.”).
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the use of DNA profiling, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “together, the
weight of these interests is monumental.” 88

B. The Spread of Familial DNA Searches
Recall that a standard DNA test compares the chemical base sequences at
thirteen loci of crime scene DNA to a database inhabitant’s profile and that a
perfect match will have identical sequences at those thirteen loci. 89 If no
perfect matches are found, law enforcement can order what is known as a
familial search. The FBI defines a familial search as a “second deliberate
search [of a DNA database] in order to identify close biological relatives of the
perpetrator in the known offender database,” which is only to be used after a
failed initial match. 90 In this case, the offender database is searched not for a
perfect thirteen-loci match, but for a partial match such as an eight-loci match,
which would suggest a close biological relative. 91 This two-step process for a
familial match removes about 99% of non-related DNA profiles. 92 The FBI’s
definition has been criticized though, as partial matches are sometimes found
(and then used) inadvertently, rendering the “deliberate search” definition too
narrow. 93 Additionally, familial searches have been maligned as they are
functionally searches based on genetic association rather than due to
individualized suspicion or a conviction. 94 Not all uses of familial DNA
searches are controversial however. The technique has been used in instances
of child support, missing persons cases, and even for the confirmation that
Osama Bin Landen was the man the Navy SEALS killed. 95
Just as England kickstarted the DNA identification movement in the 1980s
that eventually made its way over to the United States, in 2003, England was
the first county to formally authorize familial searches. 96 England’s diminished
notion of privacy has placed it at the forefront of the power creep that has
characterized the movement. 97 England was the first country to allow for the

88
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United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 839 (9th Cir. 2004).
Suter, supra note 8, at 319.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 319–20.
Agueros, supra note 23.
Suter, supra note 8, at 324.
Id. at 358.
Kaye, supra note 3, at 113–14.
Suter, supra note 8, at 324.
See Frederick Bieber & David Lazer, Guilt by Association, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 23, 2004, at 20
(noting that the U.K. “became the first country to permit the DNA profile of anyone arrested to be
kept indefinitely, regardless of whether they are subsequently convicted”).
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retention of arrestee DNA samples, regardless of subsequent conviction, and
the familial search technique there is both widespread and uncontroversial. 98
The technique has found success in England, getting credited for solving at
least nine cases by 2005. 99 By 2006, the technique gained limited acceptance
in the U.S., with the FBI permitting CODIS familial searches as a last resort. 100
At the local level, some regions are conducting familial searches in an informal
manner, leading one study to declare a “startling lack of transparency in
rulemaking.” 101
However, other jurisdictions have demonstrated
apprehension towards the constitutional and privacy concerns concerning
familial searching, waiting for express directive from their legislatures before
engaging in the practice. 102
The expansion of DNA search power and the allure of familial searches
cannot be denied. 103 Due to the correlation between poverty, neighborhoods,
and crime (not to mention any psychological factors), there is a high instance
of crime running in a family, with “one study show[ing] that thirty percent of
inmates had brothers who were also incarcerated, and another that ‘nearly half
of jail inmates had at least one close relative who had been incarcerated.’” 104
Familial searches could effectively double or triple the size of the DNA
database and allow for police to use volunteered DNA from a suspect’s family
if the suspect refuses to provide a sample and they cannot get a court order. 105
Additionally, familial searches have been used to revive cold cases 106 and
exonerate long-imprisoned people. 107 For instance, police caught the prolific
“Bind, Torture, Kill” serial killer, Dennis Rader, by analyzing DNA submitted
by his daughter. 108 The technique was also famously used to catch the “Grim
Sleeper,” a Los Angeles-based serial killer who committed his murders over
the course of thirty years. 109 In this case, the police partially matched DNA
98
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See Duncan Carling, Note, Less Privacy Please, We’re British: Investigating Crime with DNA in the
U.K. and the U.S., 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 487, 495 (2008) (noting that arrestee
sampling is “an accepted and widespread practice in the U.K.”).
Suter, supra note 8, at 324–25.
Id. at 325–26.
Id. at 326.
Id.
See id. at 318 n.51 (“President Obama has even recently called for arrestees to have their DNA
collected and stored in the national database.”).
Suter, supra note 8, at 321.
Id. at 320–21.
Pattock, supra note 42, at 852.
Lina Hogan, Note, Fourth Amendment - Guilt by Relation: If Your Brother is Convicted of a Crime,
You Too May Do Time, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 543, 549–50 (2008).
Suter, supra note 8, at 320.
Pattock, supra note 42, at 851–52.
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found on a victim to Christopher Franklin, who was caught on a weapons
charge a year prior. 110 Since Franklin was born after the first of the Grim
Sleeper’s killings, detectives investigated his more appropriately-aged family
members, eventually using DNA collected from a thrown out pizza to find a
perfect match with Franklin’s father, solving the cold case. 111 And just as
traditional DNA searching has exonerated an estimated 212 people, familial
searching freed Darryl Hunt after an eighteen-year imprisonment when the
brother of the true killer turned up in a CODIS search. 112 Surely, as familial
searching and DNA databases become more powerful, these stories will
become the norm rather than the newsworthy.

C. The Constitutionality of Familial DNA Searches
Despite the highlighted successes of familial DNA searches, it is
understandable why the technique has caused some law enforcement agencies
to wait for express authorization. As Justice Breyer wrote, “DNA
identification may raise privacy concerns. Suppose a check of a convict DNA
database reveals a near miss, thereby implicating a relative who has no record
of conviction and was consequently not included in the bank. What kind of
legal rules should apply?” 113 No court has tested the technique thus far, but
commentators have pointed to the policy implications, Fourth Amendment,
and Fourteenth Amendment as potentially raising issues. 114
Consider a case where police retrieve DNA from a crime scene, run it
through the offender database, and do not find a match. Next, they conduct
a second query, a familial search (search A), which leads to a partial match to
a person who has been incarcerated for ten years and thus could not have
committed the crime. Then, the officers investigate the family members of
the partial match, just as they did with the Grim Sleeper, and attempt to
compel them into giving a DNA sample (search B). Could the DNA be
compelled without individualized probable cause?
110
111

112
113

114

Id. at 152.
Id. at 852. Courts have held that a person has no privacy interest in their discarded DNA as it has
been abandoned. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (holding that a person had
no privacy interest in their trash); see also Commonwealth v. Cabral, 866 N.E.2d 429, 431 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2007) (holding that police scrapping spit off a sidewalk was not a Fourth Amendment
violation).
Hogan, supra note 107, at 549, 552.
Jeffrey Rosen, Genetic Surveillance for All, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2009), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2009/03/genetic-surveillance-for-all.html (discussing Justice Breyer’s foreword in a book on
justice and technology).
Kaye, supra note 3, at 112, 125, 129.
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Framing familial searches through a reasonableness test like that of
115
Familial searches
are distinct from the traditional DNA search because the people who the
search is targeted at are not in custody; they have no diminished expectation
of privacy, nor is there an interest in preventing their recidivism. Plainly, they
suffer increased police scrutiny based on their relatives’ past involvement with
the criminal justice system. 116 Regarding search A, we are considering the
database inhabitant’s interest in not having his DNA be used to track his
family. 117 While finding standing could be an issue (in the absence of
compulsion of DNA), the information revealed during these investigations
could lead to significant embarrassment and emotional injury in instances
where genetic relations differ from social relations, notably in cases of
adoption, adultery, incest, or assisted pregnancy. 118 This information could
come to light inadvertently, or police could use it as leverage to pressure a
person into revealing information. 119
Additionally, the “special needs” rationale relied on by the King Court is
significantly weakened in this instance. Familial searches serve purely law
enforcement purposes, there is no threat to the officers nor any bail
considerations to take into account. While the practice might have a broader
social purpose, and as courts have noted, could provide a potential familial
deterrent effect, 120 this is unlikely to fulfil the special needs requirement. 121 In
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Supreme Court held that a hospital’s policy
of giving diagnostic medical records to a forensic lab served no special
purpose. The Court reasoned that “[b]ecause law enforcement involvement
always serves some broader social purpose or objective, under respondents’
view, virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized
under the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its
ultimate, rather than immediate, purpose.” 122 Similarly here, the secondary
query and DNA collection serves no special interest beyond aiding the law

Maryland v. King leads to a much closer balancing test.

115

116
117

118
119
120

121
122

See Hogan, supra note 107, at 580 (discussing balancing test that utilizes reasonableness and totality
of the circumstances framework).
Suter, supra note 8, at 349.
The family members would not have a claim because they have no privacy interest in another
individual’s DNA.
Suter, supra note 8, at 343.
Id. at 345.
Once the practice becomes societally known, people will be aware that they are more likely to be
caught if someone in their family has been arrested.
Pattock, supra note 42, at 868.
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001).
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enforcement investigation, and therefore its permissibility must rely purely on
a reasonableness balancing test.
Balancing societal interests against an individual’s Fourth Amendment
rights will likely result in the permissibility of familial searches. Maryland v.
King and subsequent cases have shown just how favored DNA searches and
databases are with respect to a balancing test. 123 If a court must balance the
reasonableness of the search against its intrusive nature, then when taking into
account the aforementioned successes in cold cases and exonerations, the
societal interest will likely win out. 124 With respect to the “family secrets”
argument, there would need to be a showing that familial searching is
somehow more damaging and more likely to reveal information than other
legal police investigatory methods. 125 Due to the success stories, the
exonerations, and the legal precedents, a court is likely to find that under the
totality of the circumstances, familial searching is not unreasonable. 126
With respect to search B, in order for the police to use a partial match
to compel production of DNA from family members, courts will require a
warrant, and it is unclear whether the partial match alone will satisfy the
probable cause standard. The collection of the DNA is undeniably a search,
and the Court has shown an interest in protecting bodily integrity. 127 This is
doubly true when the information gleaned has the potential to contain
valuable and compromising private medical facts. 128 However, familial
searches rely on the same “junk” DNA STR search that traditional DNA
searches rely on, 129 meaning that they are unlikely to trigger the additional
privacy protections that a court might provide for medical secrets. 130 Once
again, there are no special needs when it comes to compelling DNA from
family members not under arrest and no apparent exigency exists.
Therefore, if the police attempt to compel DNA production from an

123

See Maryland. v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 460 (2013) (holding that DNA searches are akin to fingerprint

124

See Pattock, supra note 42, at 864 (referencing Supreme Court cases where societal interest won out

identification).

125
126

127
128

129

130

over individual privacy in cases of mandatory DNA collection and retention).
Kaye, supra note 3, at 145.
In United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1221 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated as moot, 659 F.3d 761 (9th
Cir. 2011) the 9th Circuit seemed to indicate it was unconcerned with any constitutional issues
stemming from this aspect of DNA retention (“It is questionable whether the person … whose familial
comparison helped focus the inquiry, has suffered any invasion of his or her constitutional right to
privacy.”).
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec.’s Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (noting how chemical analysis of
urine can reveal facts about whether a person is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic).
See infra Part III.B (“The FBI defines a familial search as a ‘second deliberate search of a DNA
database.’”).
Supra Part II.B.
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individual solely on the basis of a partial match, a court should require a
warrant to be issued and must determine whether a partial match is sufficient
to support a probable cause standard. This determination is likely
dependent on the reliability of the query and the likelihood that the family
member is the perpetrator. 131
Finally, familial searches could be challenged under a Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection claim. It’s fairly clear that familial searches will
have a disparate impact on certain communities, both racial and religious. 132
28.5% of African-American men, 16% of Hispanic men, and 4.4% of white
men will be convicted of a felony at some point during their life. 133 The
disparate impact from these numbers will be additionally exacerbated by
racially disparate arrest rates, which will also potentially place arrestees’ DNA
in a database. Their DNA will be added to a database that was not intended
for familial searches when it was created, subjecting the arrestees and their
families to lifelong genetic surveillance. Additionally, certain groups like
Mormons, Hispanics, and low-income people tend to have larger families
“and are therefore will be more vulnerable familial searches.” 134 However, this
disparate impact is unlikely to be enough to trigger strict scrutiny, and the law
enforcement interests are surely sufficient to justify a rational basis.
The case that would generally control this issue is Washington v. Davis. 135
In that case, black applicants were rejected from becoming police officers
because they failed a written test. 136 The unsuccessful black applicants brought
a class action suit and won at the appellate level, with the court finding that the
test had a racially disparate impact and was insufficiently related to job
performance. 137 However, this ruling was reversed at the Supreme Court, with
Justice White writing that there must be proof of discriminatory intent or
purpose in order to invalidate a government statute. 138 A government action
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because it has a “racially

131

132
133
134
135
136
137
138

See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983) (explaining that in order for a magistrate to issue a
search warrant, he must evaluate the evidence under a “flexible, common-sense,” totality-of-thecircumstances approach. He must determine whether there is sufficient information to establish
probable cause and his actions must be beyond a mere ratification of others’ conclusions).
Kaye, supra note 3, at 128–29.
Agueros, supra note 23.
Kaye, supra note 3, at 127.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Id. at 232.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 246–48.
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disproportionate impact.” 139 This ruling was largely grounded in practical
logic:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid,
absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race
more than another would be far-reaching and would raise serious questions
about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor
and the average black than to more affluent white[s]. 140

Washington v. Davis created an intent requirement in order to trigger strict
scrutiny on a facially neutral government action. The intent standard was
further clarified in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,
wherein the Supreme Court ruled that there was no equal protection violation
even when a neutral law had a disproportionately adverse effect on a minority
so long as the law was not passed with a discriminatory intent. 141 To be
constitutionally improper, the legislature must have passed the law “because
of” the disparate impact, not “in spite of” it. 142
Applying that framework to familial DNA searches, it is clear that there is
no Fourteenth Amendment violation. While some protected groups are
disproportionally affected, this is a facially neutral apparatus with no racial
animus. 143 It will not trigger struct scrutiny, and the increased legitimacy and
accuracy of DNA identification will survive a rational basis test.
III. THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF
COMMERCIAL DNA DATABASES

A. The Science Behind Commercial Databases
In 2007, 23andMe became the first company in the world to offer
commercial DNA testing. 144 By 2011, the company had 100,000 customers
and in 2020 it reported that it had over ten million. 145 It is not alone; Ancestry,
launched in 2012, has over sixteen million DNA profiles in its databank as of

139
140

Id. at 239.
Id. at 248.

141

Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).

142

Id.
See Kaye, supra note 3, at 128 (arguing that discrimination and equal protection claims against the

143

practice of familial searches would be “implausible.”).
144

About Us, 23ANDME, https://mediacenter.23andme.com/company/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 13,

145

23andMe History, 23andMe, https://mediacenter.23andme.com/assets/timeline/index.html (last
visited Apr. 1, 2020); About Us, 23ANDME, https://mediacenter.23andme.com/company/about-us/

2019).

(last visited Apr. 1, 2020).
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April 2020. 146 To use the companies' products, customers submit their saliva
for DNA analysis and the companies use the DNA to create individualized
family trees, conduct medical research, and reveal medical facts about the
customer’s genetic profile. The companies are open to everyone and actively
seek out underrepresented groups, 147 but by their expensive and (arguably)
impractical nature have skewed towards a wealthier, whiter clientele. 148
The companies seem to be aware of their attractive nature to law
enforcement, with 23andMe noting that “about 80 percent [of surveyed
Americans] said they had privacy concerns around DNA testing, much of that
concern stems from not knowing how their data would be protected,” and that
17 percent said privacy concerns stopped them from purchasing a test. 149
Some companies, such as Family Tree DNA, already are working with law
enforcement, allowing FBI agents to search their database. 150 The big two
companies, Ancestry and 23andMe, however, offer a defense of customers’
genetic privacy even in the face of law enforcement requests.
Ancestry has a privacy page and releases a transparency report every year. 151
Its privacy page notes that it will “share your Personal Information if [Ancestry]
believe[s] it is reasonably necessary to comply with [a] valid legal process (e.g.,
subpoenas [or] warrants).” 152 Further, the company says that while a user can
request to have their information deleted, if they have consented to help with
research, the data cannot be deleted. 153 In 2017, Ancestry’s transparency
report stated that it received thirty-four requests from law enforcement for user
information; however, all of the requests were related to financial transactions
and none asked for genetic material. 154 That said, Ancestry has supplied

146

Company Overview, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/corporate/about-ancestry/company-facts

147

The

(last visited Apr. 1, 2020).

148

149

150
151

152

153
154

African Genetics Project, 23ANDME: 23ANDMEBLOG (Oct. 12, 2016)
https://blog.23andme.com/23andme-research/the-african-genetics-project/.
Isabelle Mencia, Why DNA Ancestry Tests are Struggling to Avoid White Bias, STUDY BREAK (Mar.
5, 2018) https://studybreaks.com/news-politics/dna-ancestry-tests/.
National Survey Shows Strong Interest in DNA Testing, 23ANDME (Sept. 18, 2017)
https://mediacenter.23andme.com/press-releases/national-survey-shows-strong-interest-dna-testing/.
Hernandez, supra note 11.
Privacy Statement Archive, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacy-archive (last visited
Apr. 1, 2020).
Website Privacy Statement, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.ca/cs/legal/privacystatement (last
visited Mar. 12, 2019).
Id.
Ancestry 2017 Transparency Report, ANCESTRY, (Dec. 31, 2017) https://www.ancestry.ca/cs/
transparency.
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genetic information to law enforcement in the past, notably in 2014, which led
to a false-positive match. 155
23andMe’s privacy page claims to be “technically and legally” secure from
law enforcement, and boasts of having never given genetic info to them. 156
Allegedly, this is because they test for a different sequence (STP) rather than
the STR pattern that CODIS uses. 157 Additionally, 23andMe claims that their
service cannot be reliably connected to an individual in a verifiable manner
such that it could be used in court. 158 To use 23andMe, a person orders a spitkit and then mails their DNA sample to the company. 159 Because the person
who ordered the kit and the one who gave the sample are not necessarily the
same person, the company claims that the DNA cannot be validated as
belonging to the named person. 160 While this does seem to be a surmountable
issue, 23andMe maintains that they have never given information to a law
enforcement agency. 161

B. The Relevant Doctrines and Caselaw
Building off of the analysis that DNA tests are permissible under the
Fourth Amendment and that familial DNA searches would survive both
Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment challenges, police use of
commercial DNA databases brings with it its own set of legal issues.
Commercial database DNA involves personal information willingly given to a
company for non-law-enforcement purposes. Additionally, the collected
DNA contains not only “junk” DNA but also the “coding” DNA that contains
the personal information needed to create a commercial genetic profile. 162
155

156

157
158
159
160

161
162

Jennifer Lynch, How Private DNA Data Led Idaho Cops on a Wild Goose Chase and Linked an
Innocent Man to a 20-year-old Murder Case, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 1, 2015)
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/how-private-dna-data-led-idaho-cops-wild-goose-chase-andlinked-innocent-man-20.
Kate Black & Zerina Curevac, 23andPrivacy: Your Data and Law Enforcement, 23ANDME:
23ANDMEBLOG (Mar. 16, 2016), https://blog.23andme.com/23andme-and-you/23andprivacy-yourdata-law-enforcement/.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Stephanie M. Lee, Cops Want to Look At 23andMe Customers’ DNA, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 21,
2015), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/stephaniemlee/law-enforcement-is-interested-in23andme-user-data.
Black & Curevac, supra note 156.
DNA is composed of coding and non-coding regions. Non-coding DNA, termed “Junk” DNA is
what is used to identify a person, but does not show more invasive characteristics like genetic traits.
See King, 569 U.S. at 442–43. Coding DNA is what is used by commercial companies as it contains
the genetic traits such as ancestry and illnesses.
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Despite all this, police use of these databases should be permissible, at least
constitutionally, due to the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy once
one has given away their non-essential records to a third-party. 163
In United States v. Miller, police used the defendants' bank transactions as
evidence that they were participating in a criminal conspiracy. 164 The
defendants tried to suppress the transactions under the theory that they had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in those documents and that it was improper
for the police to seize the paperwork without a warrant. 165 The Supreme Court
upheld the conviction, ruling that once someone has shared information with
a third-party, they no longer have a reasonable expectation of privacy with
respect to that information. 166 The Court additionally pointed to precedent
supporting the notion that deposit slips are elements of commercial
transactions and therefore unprotected. 167 Also pertinent is United States v.
White, where the Court held that even misplaced expectations of trust (talking
to an informant) are unprotected, despite the chilling effects it may have. 168
Thus, until recently, anything given to a third party, even if under a misplaced
expectation of privacy, lacked constitutional protection.
The Supreme Court however has begun to narrow the third-party
doctrine, 169 likely due to how much information is being sent to data
companies. Described most succinctly in Justice Sotomayor’s Jones
concurrence, there is a concern that so much of daily life is indispensably and
inadvertently being shared that the third-party doctrine threatens to completely
erase the Fourth Amendment. 170 This issue notably arose in United States v.
Carpenter, wherein the police used cell phone tracking technology to locate a
defendant without a warrant. 171 In a 5-4 holding, the Court held that despite
an individual “giving” his location through his cell phone to a third-party (the
cell tower companies), he still had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 172 The
Court recognized that expectations of privacy in the digital age produce new
challenges that do not align with precedent, and that the personal “nature of
163

164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172

United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). The Court articulated the impact third parties
have on one’s reasonable expectation of privacy. However, Miller did not address the distinction
between essential and non-essential records nor the permissibility of DNA searches.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 440–441.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971).
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2011).
Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16.
Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2212.
Id. at 2217.
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the particular documents sought” carved out an exception to the third-party
doctrine. 173 This holding was bolstered by the indispensable nature of cell
phones and the lack of voluntary affirmative action on the individual’s part. 174
In a broad reading of Carpenter’s holding, Professors Freiwald and
Smith identified several factors that the Court used in defining its carve-out
in addition to the classic Katz test: Whether the investigatory method was
hidden, continuous in its tracking nature, indiscriminate in what information
and how much information the police had access to, intrusive in revealing
deeply personal information, and whether the expense of the search would
allow law enforcement to obtain a tremendous amount of information that, if
using more traditional techniques, would have taken much longer and cost
much more to acquire. 175 Using these factors, the Court reined in the thirdparty doctrine, leaning on Riley 176 to show that the assumption of risk
framework inherent in the third-party doctrine is not mechanical, but rather
has some components of voluntary and knowledgeable action. 177 In the wake
of Carpenter, Freiwald and Smith called for a “closer analysis when it comes
to privately maintained databases of non-location information” as Carpenter
“wipes out” the argument that information “merely by [its] storage with a
third party, [is] immune from Fourth Amendment protection by virtue of the
third-party doctrine.” 178
While Carpenter and Jones dealt with electronic tracking technology, there
is other precedent that suggests the Court will not be willing to extend the thirdparty doctrine to information given for diagnostic purposes. In Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, a hospital partnered with law enforcement to submit
pregnant women’s blood given for diagnostic reasons to a forensic lab in order
to test for cocaine content. 179 The policy was designed to reduce cocaine usage
among pregnant women, which was harming the unborn child, after previous
attempts requiring mandatory therapy, education, and treatment were found
ineffective. 180 The Court held that this was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment despite the medical information being given to a third-party (the
hospital) because of a patient’s reasonable expectation that medical

173
174
175

176

177
178
179
180

Id. at 2217–18.
Id. at 2218.
Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near-Perfect Surveillance, 132
HARV. L. REV. 205, 220–21 (2018) (emphasis added).
Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (giving special protection to cell phones due to their
indispensable and personal nature).
Freiwald & Smith, supra note 175, at 224–25.
Id. at 230.
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 69–70.
Id. at 70.
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information would not be disseminated without her consent. 181 The Court
further rejected any special needs exception noting the involvement of law
enforcement at every step of the process, and the general interest in crime
control. 182 While not expressly stated, the Court may have also been weighing
the negative externality of disincentivizing cocaine-using women from giving
birth at a hospital.
When considering the use of new technology for searches, it is also
necessary to survive the Kyllo test. There, police used a thermal imager to
scan a house in search of marijuana-growing glow lamps. 183 This technology
was new at the time and was used without a warrant. 184 The Court suppressed
the information gathered because “[w]here . . . the Government uses a device
that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance
is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.” 185 While
homes generally have enhanced privacy protection, the concept of regularlyused technology not triggering additional protections is potent in the present
instance.
IV. ANALYSIS
On what grounds could law enforcement gain access to the wealth of data
that Ancestry, 23andMe, and other similar companies possess? Do customers
have any reasonable expectations of privacy in their information once given
away? What about in the case of FamilyTree, which was both named the best
company for “strict privacy” 186 and was the first to openly volunteer for FBI
cooperation?

A. Police Use of Commercial DNA Banks Should be Constitutionally

181
182

183
184
185
186

Id. at 78.
Id. at 79–80; see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (internal citations
omitted) (“The primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoints is in the end to advance
‘the general interest in crime control.’ We decline to suspend the usual requirement of individualized
suspicion . . . . ”).
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
Id. at 30, 40.
Id. at 40.
Brad Berman, Best DNA Testing Kits, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://health.usnews.com/wellness/articles/2019-01-07/best-dna-testing-kits;
Dieter
Holger,
FamilyTreeDNA Review: Unique Genealogical Collaboration, But an Outdated Interface,
(Dec.
14,
2018,
5:00AM
PST),
PCWORLD
https://www.pcworld.com/article/3326568/familytreedna-review.html.
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Permissible
Following Katz, a court would need to find that someone, either the user
or the company has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the
DNA in order to gain the protections of the Fourth Amendment. The court
should hold that a user has no reasonable expectation of privacy in their DNA
once it has been sent to a company, though with the recent narrowing of the
third-party doctrine it is not completely obvious that the State has an
overpowering interest. The court should also hold that an individual does not
have a claim for constitutional protection under the Kyllo framework nor a
property interest in their DNA. Further, the evidentiary defense that
23andMe raised seems solvable with circumstantial evidence authenticating
the sample and the testimony of the scientist who did the testing in accordance
with Melendez-Diaz. 187 However, the court should hold that the companies
have a privacy interest, or at least that law enforcement will be required to
conduct a pre-compliance review before a neutral party prior to accessing the
genetic records.
The most persuasive argument for cutting back the third-party doctrine for
commercial DNA banks is the “personal nature of the information.” The
DNA samples sent in contain private medical facts, something that could give
them some protection, as in Skinner. 188 Applying the Carpenter factors
identified by Freiwald and Smith leaves questions as to whether the third-party
doctrine would even apply. Certainly, commercial DNA searches would be
hidden, done in secret, away from the public view. The search would not be
continuous but would be inarguably indiscriminate in the amount of people
captured by the search (especially considering benign family members), and
intrusive given the personal nature of genetic material. Finally, DNA testing
is becoming increasingly cheap and quick, implicating the expense factor. 189
The court could also look to Ferguson to carve out a third-party exception.
There, the Supreme Court found patients to have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in information given for diagnostic purposes. 190 Similarly, many people
undergo genetic testing in order to discover potential illnesses and submit their
DNA for research purposes, which society should not disincentivize. 191
Finally, due to the privacy statements provided by the companies, the

187
188
189
190
191

Melendez-Diaz v. Mass., 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009).
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
Murphy, supra note 66.
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78.
23andMe, supra note 156.
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individuals certainly have a subjective expectation of privacy that their
information will not be disseminated.
The court should find however that the third-party doctrine does extend
to commercial DNA banks. Inarguably, customers of these companies took
an affirmative action in giving away their information to a third-party. The
customers consented to the storage and use of the data, and their misplaced
trust in a company that they were told was the best for “strict privacy” would
be an inadequate argument under White. 192 Further cutting against the
rationale of the Carpenter majority that carved out a modern-age exception to
the third-party doctrine, there is nothing “essential” or “indispensable” about
DNA tests. Cell phones are ubiquitous and necessary to modern life; they
contain pictures, addresses, and are how we contact loved ones in
emergencies. They even gain heightened protection compared almost any
other object. 193 The court should not find that this is the case for DNA tests.
Customers did not need to give their DNA to a company in the same way that
a soon-to-be mother is vulnerable to a doctor’s orders. In response to the
“personal nature of the information” argument, if law enforcement only
requested the information obtained from the “junk” DNA, then this argument
is unlikely to be persuasive, as no private medical information will be
disclosed. Additionally, the DNA sample could be thought of as an element
of the commercial transaction and therefore, also receive no constitutional
protection. 194 The court should also not recognize a Kyllo argument to find a
reasonable expectation of privacy, because at this point the general public is
using DNA testing. 195
With respect to the property theory of the Fourth Amendment, it is
similarly unlikely that a consumer could make a successful property claim on
their DNA once it is given away. 196 In Moore v. Regents of California, a
physician-scientist at UCLA took diagnostic samples of Moore’s blood and
bone marrow and unbeknownst to Moore, used them for research. 197 Moore’s
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See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (holding that misplaced trust doesn’t create a
reasonable expectation of privacy).
See Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014) (finding that absent exigent circumstances,
police can seize the phone, but need a warrant to actually search the data inside).
Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
For an argument that the Fourth Amendment does provide some protection of DNA property and
that legislatures should enact policies regarding DNA testing websites, see Antony Barone Kolenc,
“23 and Plea”: Limiting Police use of Genealogy Sites after Carpenter v. United States, 122 W. VA.
L. REV. 54, 100–01 (2019).
Moore v. Regents of Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479, 481 (Cal. 1990).

August 2020]

23POLICEMENANDME

1519

cells turned out to be scientifically and commercially significant, leading to
substantial profit and many discoveries, so Moore brought suit claiming he
had a property right to his cells. 198 The Supreme Court of California found
that Moore had no property rights to his discarded cells or to the research or
profits made from the cell lines. The court rejected the argument that
someone has an absolute right to the unique products of their body. 199
The commercial DNA companies here are using the DNA for research
and commercial purposes. Further, the informed consent here is being done
in much more comprehensive ways than in Moore. While customers can
request their DNA profiles to be deleted, this is not true if the profiles are
being used for research, which is the case for many of the profiles. A court is
unlikely to find that customers have any property interest in their abandoned
DNA.
One issue to note is the potential mitigation of Fourteenth Amendment
claims with the proliferation of police use of commercial DNA databases.
Due to the underrepresentation of African-American and Native American
samples in the commercial databases, police currently actually have a much
more powerful database for investigating wealthier, white suspects. While this
would not alleviate the concerns against religious groups, the continued lack
of discriminatory intent would ultimately defeat any such claim.
With respect to 23andMe’s chain-of-custody argument, this appears to be
a solvable problem with good police and prosecutorial work. Matching the
user (who sent in the sample) to the buyer (who purchased the sample) could
be confirmed through witness interviews, or at least provide a lead through the
purchaser who might know the user. With respect to testimony in court, the
initial DNA sample was not analyzed in preparation for use at a judicial
proceeding, so it is unlikely to be held to be testimonial and therefore trigger
the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. 200 Even if it were analyzed for
such a purpose, 23andMe stated that it has had five requests by law
enforcement since 2007. It would not be an intolerable burden for a scientist
(or the law enforcement forensic scientist who ran the CODIS match) to testify
to the procedure’s accuracy. 201 Commercial DNA database users are unlikely
to have any constitutional protections in their submitted samples. The data
was freely and affirmatively given, and their misplaced trust does not protect
198
199
200
201

Id. at 487.
Id. at 489, 491.
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S at 310.
See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 683–84 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing the
burdens on forensic scientists as a reason for his dissent).
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them. Nor will the users’ families have any constitutional protections involving
the user’s DNA for the same reasons mentioned above in the familial search
analysis. 202
Finally, there are the privacy rights of the companies themselves to
consider. Given the economic power that comes from the privacy and security
of genetic data, it is clear that the companies have an interest in keeping that
information secure. 203 The case most analogous to this situation is City of Los
Angeles v. Patel, in which the Los Angeles Code required hotels to retain the
information of their guests for up to 90 days. 204 If the hotel failed to do so or
failed to turn over the records to the police upon request, the owner faced
criminal penalties. 205 The Supreme Court struck down this policy, holding it
an unreasonable search and seizure. 206 It held that in order to conduct a
warrantless search of a hotel, there must be some sort of pre-compliance
review before a neutral party. 207 While the Court recognized the hotel’s
interest in its records, it did not expressly recognize that the hotel had a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Rather, this case turned on whether the
hotel industry fell under the administrative search “special needs” exception
by being a “closely-regulated industry.” 208 A closely-regulated industry is one
that presents a clear and significant risk to public welfare such as firearms,
mining, or running an automobile junkyard. 209 DNA companies do not fall
into this category, and as such will be able to require some pre-compliance
review before any information is provided. As Ancestry and 23andMe both
note that they require subpoenas or a warrant before they turn over any
information, it is likely that they would support this argument. 210
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See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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City of L.A. v. Patel, 135 S.Ct. 2243, 2248 (2015), quoting Patel v. City of Los Angeles, 738 F.3d
1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[t]he business records covered by § 41.49 are the hotel’s private
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CONCLUSION
Familial DNA searching is still new, but we have seen numerous examples
of damaging false positives, including from commercial DNA banks. 211
Beyond just DNA searches, the bungled 2006 Duke Lacrosse investigation 212
and the Reddit witch-hunt 213 in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon
Bombings illustrate the destructive cloud of suspicion that mishandled
investigations can cause. Even if the investigation is handled correctly, an
unknown family link, or lack thereof could damage a family in a way that is
not legally cognizable. Yet the positives surely outweigh the danger.
Murderers have been caught, innocent people have been exonerated, and the
DNA searching technology will only become more accurate. Familial DNA
searching, even using commercial databanks, is not a practice that should be
done away with.
Since there is unlikely to be constitutional protection given to the users or
their family members, and only limited protection given to companies, it is up
to the legislatures to enact regulations and protections at all levels of
government. While the state of genetic surveillance in the U.S. is nowhere
near the nightmare that is China, 214 the lack of regulations at the local level has
led to increased surveillance of innocent people. 215 Local databases “are
211
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designed with the assumption that they will ultimately include a large number
of DNA profiles from people who will never be linked to a crime.” 216
Moving forward, legislatures should adopt the European approach, where
law enforcement cannot use an investigative method until it has been
authorized by statute. 217 At the minimum, there should be a uniform set of
regulations in order to minimize silver-plattering. 218 Legislatures must rise to
the challenge. They must enact regulations to provide better notice to those
who volunteer their data for non-law enforcement purposes and to protect
those who right now are protected only by the evolving whims of a company’s
internal policies.
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Where law enforcement duties get shuttled to the level with the most discretion.
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